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Proscribing Hate Speech in a Post-September 11 World: Enacting Effective Regulation of
Anti-Muslim Invective in order to Stem Domestic Terror Threats
Rabia Hassan
May 1, 2013

Part I:

Introduction:
In the wake of 9/11, maintaining domestic security has become a substantial and

compelling governmental interest.1 Against a backdrop of heightened anti-Muslim rhetoric,
establishing a federal anti-hate speech code which proscribes certain religious slurs would most
probably be justified. This action would be indicated to avoid the imminent threat of violence
directed at Muslim communities living in the United States. Pundits from across the scholarly
spectrum, supporters and debunkers alike, have conceded that there is some harm in “hate
speech.”2 In order to avoid the harm stemming from such hate speech necessitates the
promulgation of an anti-hate speech ordinance which would restrict the use of religious slurs
aimed at Muslims, Arabs and individuals of Middle Eastern descent following September 11th.
Affording Muslim communities extra protection in the form of an anti-hate speech
ordinance is necessary because a post 9/11 backlash has left them vulnerable to mistreatment by
the masses as well as increased regulation by the federal government. History provides the best

1

See generally e.g. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, 236-239 (W.W. Norton &
Co., Inc., 1st ed. 2005) (describing the different occurrences in United States history where during times of war there
are heightened national security concerns and greater deference is given to the curtailment of 1st Amendment rights).
2
See JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 29-30 (Harvard University Press, 1st ed. 2012) (describing
how individuals like Anthony Lewis, staunchly opposed to the promulgation of anti-hate speech ordinances, have
diluted their opposition because we currently inhabit an age where “…words have inspired acts of mass murder and
terrorism”. The danger does not just come from those who use words to incite violence but also from individuals
towards whom such words of violence are directed and feel the only way to respond is by violence); Onder
Bakircioglu, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 2-3 (2008) (indicating that
while free speech is of “fundamental importance for democratic societies,” it must be protected in a way which
recognizes both the benefits and harm that stem from it).
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reason why heightened protection is essential.3 The best example of this can be viewed from the
treatment of Japanese-Americans in the wake of Pearl Harbor, which the Supreme Court did not
condemn as indicated by their decisions in Hirabayashi v. United States and Korematsu v. United
States. While the Supreme Court has been heavily criticized for its decision in the aforementioned cases, Geoffrey Stone’s main point in his seminal work Perilous Times, still remains
salient: during times of war or in the wake of national security threats, certain individuals are
more vulnerable in the United States than others.4 This point is most apparent in the postSeptember 11th cases involving US citizens and US permanent residents suspected of being
enemy combatants, where due to reasons of national security, the government has the right to
constrict the due process rights of those individuals.5 In a post-September 11 world, unless there
is a suspension of the government’s “war on terror” or a similar abatement in the national
security threat, Muslims in America are more susceptible to greater discrimination, verbal and
physical attacks as well as hate speech than members of other cultural and religious groups.
Because there is no seeming end to the aftermath of September 11th, nor the national security
concerns stemming from it, relying on the marketplace of ideas to eradicate religious slurs
directed against Muslims is impractical and will only be counterproductive.
Communities that are marginalized in the aftermath of a cataclysmic event are more apt
to become targets of hateful speech. In those contexts, the speech must be prohibited in order to
avoid the violence and incitement that the words in context are likely to elicit. Therefore, this
paper proposes that one way to prevent the rise of domestic terror threats originating from the

3

See Stone, supra note 1 at 272-280 (describing the treatment of Japanese Americans after the bombing at Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941).
4
See Stone, supra note 1 at 236-239.
5
See e.g. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 1, 3-5 (D.D.C. 2010); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2716-2717
(2004).
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ever growing marginalization of Muslims post September 11, is through the promulgation of an
anti-hate speech ordinance. The proposed ordinance would be context specific and therefore
effective until national security threats stemming from the September 11 events were no longer a
concern for the United States. In addition, the proposed ordinance would only prohibit the use of
specific racial and religious slurs normally directed at individuals who are, or appear to be,
Muslim or of Middle Eastern origin. Both limitations are necessary as their inclusion enables the
proposed ordinance to not present constitutional challenges to the First Amendment as long as
domestic terrorism still poses a threat to the government.
The increased marginalization of Muslims post 9/11 and the effect of this marginalization
on the Muslim community and the United States as a whole, necessitates an anti-hate speech
ordinance. Employment discrimination statistics maintained by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, (EEOC) indicates that discrimination directed against Muslims and
Middle Eastern individuals have increased significantly since September 11.6 The statistics
reported by the EEOC demonstrate a significant increase of workplace discrimination directed
against Muslims. However, the discrimination faced is most likely much larger than reported
and to an extent, under-represents the degree of discrimination experienced given the inability
and reluctance of members of minority communities to report harassment and discrimination.7
Many of the aforementioned cases filed with the EEOC were discrimination cases based on
employer appearance policies, prohibiting employees from hearing religious headdress, such as

6

See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Statistics, National Origin-Based Charges FY 1997-2007,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/origin.html; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Statistics, Religion-Based
Charges FY 1997- 2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/origin.html (indicating that pre- September 11, the EEOC
received approximately 8,000 cases alleging discrimination based on national origin and religion whereas right after
September 11 and up until 2007, the EEOC received approximately 12,000 such cases. Nearly all of the reported
cases involved discrimination against individuals who were Muslims and also of Middle Eastern origin).
7
See Waldron, supra note 2 at 109.
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headscarves, turbans or maintaining beards.8 However, several of the cases were also for hostile
work environment claims created and maintained by religious and racial slurs, where plaintiffs
were repeatedly subjected to disparaging names by coworkers and supervisors like “Taliban” or
“towel-head,” even if they were Muslim but not of Middle Eastern origin.9
The 4th and 5th Circuits post September 11 dismissed the respective cases, citing
procedural grounds.10 These judgments indicate a continued assault on their “dignity [or] social
standing” within greater American society.11 Signs on street corners or on stores reflect on the
continued assault on the dignity of a community, which send different versions of this overall
message: “[d]on’t be fooled into thinking you are welcome here. The society around you may
seem hospitable and nondiscriminatory, but the truth is that you are not wanted and you and your
families will be shunned, excluded, beaten and driven out, whenever we can get away with it.”12
The man walking with his children on a “…city street in New Jersey…confronted with a signs
[such as]: ‘Muslims and 9/11! Don’t serve them, don’t speak to them and don’t let them in…they
are all called Osama [and] Jihad Central,’” cannot explain them to his children and tries to hurry
past such slogans of hate speech.13 Faced with such signs on a daily basis however, undoubtedly
assaults his dignity and erodes at his sense of belonging in America.14
Marginalization and isolation within a society does not necessarily beget domestic
terrorists.

8

See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Statistics, supra note 6.
See e.g. EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 311-313 (4th Cir. 2008); EEOC v. WC&M Enterprises, Inc.,
496 F.3d 393, 396-398 (5th Cir. 2007).
10
See id (citing timeliness of the Complaint or lack of pervasive nature of the harassment as grounds for dismissal).
11
See Waldron, supra note 2 at 5.
12
See id at 2.
13
See Waldron, supra note 2 at 1-2.
14
See id.
9
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However, violent reactions precipitated by feelings of discontent and perceived mistreatment do
and have occurred within the past few years in the United States.15 In each of the noted incidents
of domestic terrorism,16 the responsible individuals faced some of the post-September 11
backlash which hastened their feelings of social isolation, alienation, eventual radicalization and
led them to respond using violence. Curbing the domestic terror threat posed by marginalized
Muslims in a post-September 11 world is a top priority held by the United States government. In
order to effectively achieve this national security goal, the promulgation of an anti-hate speech
ordinance is crucial.

Part II:

Historical & Theoretical Antecedents of Context-based Speech Regulation

Curbing individual First Amendment values is not a foreign concept within the history of
the United States.17 In examining those particular moments where the Courts affirmed the
curtailment of First Amendment values, it becomes apparent that each came about in the wake of
devastating tragedies that shocked the American psyche and consciousness. One such tragedy
was the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941, and its devastation comparable to
world-wide calamities. There “…more than two thousand people [were killed] and…much of
15

See e.g. Andrea Elliot, For Times Sq. Suspect, Long Roots of Discontent, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2010, at A1
(describing the growing social and political isolation experienced by the Times Square Bomber, Faisal Shazhad after
September 11 which ultimately pushed him to delve into religious radicalism and lash out by engaging in domestic
terrorism); Erica Goode, Boy at Home in U.S., Swayed by One who Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2013, at A1
(reflecting on the experiences of the Tsarnaev brothers, who carried out the Boston Marathon bombings in early
April 2013 prior to the attack, highlighting the increased social and economic marginalization experienced by the
older brother post September 11 as a Muslim man living in the United States, driving him to self-radicalize and lash
out using violence); David Johnston, U.S. Knew of Suspect’s Ties to Radical Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, November 10,
2009, at A1 (referring to shift and radicalization of US born Major Nidal Malik Hasan which led him to shoot to
death 13 Marines at Fort Hood in Texas); A.G. Sulzberger, Guilty Plea Made in Plot to Bomb New York Subway,
N.Y. TIMES, February 23, 2010, at A1 (referring to the Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi who threatened to carry
out an attack on the New York subway system after he felt and experienced increasing social isolation and hostility
after September 11).
16
See id.
17
See Stone, supra note 1 at 237.
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the Pacific fleet” lay in ruins.18 Almost immediately, in order to raise national sentiment and
affirm a sense of patriotism, “…on February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive
Order no. 9066, which authorized the Army to ‘designate military areas’ from which any or all
persons may be excluded.”19 Based on Congress’ immediate ratification of Executive Order no.
9066 and its speedy yet selective implementation particularly against individuals of Japanese
descent20, the order essentially only applied against the aforementioned community.21
No reason was given for the removal of individuals of Japanese descent from certain
areas. The individuals, for reasons of national security were given temporary housing in
“detention camps…which had been set up in converted racetracks and fairgrounds.”22 While the
camps were given the label resettlement communities, the conditions were appalling and
individuals housed there were isolated from the main population, “…surrounded by barbed wire
and military police [for] three years,” making the conditions akin to a prison.23 The reason for
the isolation of Japanese Americans by the government stemmed from the public outcry and
extreme agitation in the aftermath of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, propounding on conspiracy
theories that individuals of Japanese descent were somehow responsible for the bombing. As
Stone asserts, while racial prejudice existed against individuals of Japanese ancestry in the

18

See Stone, supra note 1 at 286 (describing the extent of the destruction caused by the Japanese when they
bombed Pearl Harbor).
19
See id. at 286-288.
20
See Stone, supra note 1 at 287 (describing how over the next few months after the enactment of President
Roosevelt’s Executive Order, approximately 120,000 men, women and children, some of whom were US citizens
but of Japanese were “ordered to leave their homes in California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona”).
21
See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub L. No. 722, 62 Stat. 683, 765 (repealed by Pub L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1258
(1976).
22
See Stone, supra note 1 at 287.
23
See id.
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several decades preceding Pearl Harbor,24 the bombing allowed for overt displays of
discrimination towards individuals of Japanese descent.
Such overt displays of discrimination or curtailment of the rights of individuals of
Japanese descent were gradual: there was no mass internment of individuals of Japanese descent
overnight after Pearl Harbor.25 However, intelligence efforts which were directed at surveying
the activities of Japanese Americans prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor increased, and plans
were made by the government to relocate such individuals into camps, for the sole purpose of
military necessity. The government’s curtailment of individual freedoms was supported by the
Supreme Court and the “ugly abyss of racism” was allowed to triumph over constitutional
freedoms.26 In a series of decisions addressing the constitutional nature of orders given by the
government under the justification of national security, the Supreme Court affirmed this defense
and ruled in favor of the government.27
One of the first such cases brought before the Supreme Court was Hirabayashi v. United
States, involving plaintiff Gordon Hirabayashi, an American citizen who was born in Auburn,
Washington.28 In the aftermath of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, one of the measures imposed by
the government under the justification of military necessity was a mass curfew on all individuals
listed, namely, Japanese Americans living in specific zones in Hawaii and on the West Coast.
Plaintiff decided to challenge the constitutional validity of the curfew, by turning himself in to
the FBI and opted to get prosecuted.29 Plaintiff was subsequently convicted for violating a

24

See Stone, supra note 1 at 287-288 (stating that laws passed in the early 1900’s showed the social and legal
intolerance towards individuals of Japanese ancestry).
25
See id.
26
See Stone, supra note 1 at 296-297.
27
See e.g. Hirabayashi v. United States, 63 S. Ct. 1375 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944).
28
See Stone, supra note 1 at 297-298.
29
See id. at 298.
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federal statute, promulgated in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor30, essentially making “…it a
misdemeanor knowingly to disregard restrictions made applicable by a military commander to
persons in a military area prescribed by him as such, all as authorized by…Executive Order [no.
9066] of the President.”31 He was charged with failing to remain within his designated zone
during the hours of 8:00pm and 6:00am, as per the curfew hours and therefore was in
contravention of a Civilian Exclusion Order issued by the military commander of that particular
area.32
The Supreme Court was asked to evaluate, principally “…whether the restriction
unconstitutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other
ancestries,” in violation of the US Constitution.33 The Supreme Court declined to find in favor
of the plaintiff and instead justified the central premise given by the Government, that “…the
adoption of [legislation] in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, of measures for the
public safety…is not to be condemned as unconstitutional merely because…racial distinctions”
were made.34 The Court further stated that “…in time of war, [constitutional government] is
charged with the responsibility of our national defense [and should be] given reasonable ground
for [acting on and] believing a threat [to be] real.”35 Based on its aforementioned reasoning, the
Court recognized as legitimate sparse evidence presented by the government in an effort to
indicate that because Japanese Americans have maintained some cultural and linguistic ties to

30

See 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
See Hirabayashi, 63 S. Ct. at 1378 (describing the charge against plaintiff stems from the mass curfew put in
place in accordance with President Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 9066).
32
See id.
33
See Hirabayashi, 63 S. Ct. at 1378.
34
See id. at 1385-1386.
35
See Hirabayashi, 63 S. Ct. at 1383.
31
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Japan, their loyalty is undoubtedly suspect and they are more prone to espionage.36 In fact, the
Court acknowledged that most of the evidence on statistics regarding Japanese-American
cultural ties or dual citizenship is based on estimates, as “no official census is available.”37 It
still, however did not question the government’s purported rationale.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court similarly glossed over the curfew’s emphasis and
application to citizens solely based on their ancestry. The Court stated that “…distinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people.”38 However, the Court gave greater deference to the government’s compelling interest in
protecting the nation from sabotage in areas they reasonably thought to be in peril from a
Japanese invasion. The Court therefore carved out an exception to the prohibition of
discrimination based on invidious categories, in times of military necessity, stating that there can
exist “…facts and circumstances…in war setting[s] where…ground [exists] for differentiating
[against] citizens of [other] ancestry from other groups in the United States.”39 In particular, the
Court stated that they “cannot close [their] eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience that, in
times of war, residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source
of danger than those of a different ancestry. Nor can we deny that Congress, and the military
authorities acting with its authorization, have constitutional power to appraise the danger in light
of facts of public notoriety.”40

36

See Hirabayashi 63 S. Ct. at 1384 (where the Supreme Court took as credible evidence sparse numbers and
conjectures presented by the government that because “large numbers of children of Japanese parentage are sent to
Japanese language schools [or] sent to Japan [to study] or [maintain] dual citizenship,” they are immediately prone
to disloyalty towards the United States).
37
See id.
38
See Hirabayashi, 63 S. Ct. at 1385-1386.
39
See id. at 1386.
40
See Hirabayashi, 63 S. Ct. at 1386.
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All in all, it was “…enough that the circumstances within the knowledge of those charged
with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the
decision which they made.”41 The aforementioned statement is particularly important because
expressly states the lowest of standard of scrutiny the Court has applied and in the future will
apply to governmental decisions curtailing even the most protected rights of individuals: rational
basis review. Normally, in order to find constitutional a governmental measure which threatens
the rights of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause by
discriminating against them on the basis of invidious categories, the governmental justification
must be the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling governmental interest.42 While the
Court attempted to skirt this proposition by scrutinizing the government’s curfew and Civilian
Exclusion Order under rational basis review and only requiring the governmental interest be
rationally related to the purported outcome, it failed to preserve the intense judicial scrutiny
historically given to Equal Protection rights of individuals.43 Therefore, in times of war the
Courts will give excessive deference to the government and curtail individual rights as long as
the justifications for curtailment appear facially plausible. The Courts will do so without
thoroughly examining the evidence behind such justifications.44 The deference historically
accorded to the government in times of crisis, nearly guarantees that an anti-hate speech
ordinance promulgated as a national security measure in the aftermath of September 11 would
survive Supreme Court review.

41

See Hirabayashi, 63 S. Ct. at 1386.
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (referring in footnote 4 to the levels of judicial
scrutiny to governmental measures which threaten the Equal Protections rights of individuals).
43
See id.
44
See Bakircioglu, supra note 2 at 3 (stating that while free speech should be restricted in some contexts, it should
be protected from arbitrary restrictions under the “pretext of national security”. In her opinion, the Supreme Court’s
extreme deference to the government after the bombing of Pearl Harbor would qualify as an arbitrary and therefore
an unconstitutional restriction of the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights).
42
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Another case demonstrating the extreme deference given by Supreme Court to the
government during times of war is Korematsu v. United States. In facts similar to Hirabayashi,
plaintiff in this case was an American citizen, born and living in Oakland California.45 On May
30, 1942 he was stopped by police in California, questioned for just walking down the street with
his girlfriend.46 While plaintiff did not initially claim to be of Japanese origin,47 he did finally
admit to his real name and ethnicity. His entire family had reported and was registered to a
particular area, under Executive Order no. 9066, but he “had not reported, because he was trying
to earn enough money to move to the Midwest with his girlfriend.”48 Plaintiff was subsequently
charged for violating Exclusion Order no. 34, which “…directed that all persons of Japanese
ancestry must be excluded from the area under the supervision of the Western Command of the
U.S. army.”49 Using reasoning similar to their holding in Hirabayashi v. United States, the
Supreme Court affirmed plaintiff’s violation of the Exclusion Order and upheld the validity of
such Exclusion Orders.50
At the outset, the Court proclaimed that it was bound by the precedent set in Hirabayashi
v. United States, and therefore were “…unable to conclude that it was beyond the war powers of
Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area
at the time they did.”51 The underlying premise the Court adopts in analyzing a governmental
interest which discriminates against individuals on the basis of their ancestry is one of extreme
deference. The deference is extreme, so much so that the exclusion of an entire ethnic group

45

See Stone, supra note 1 at 299.
See id.
47
See Stone, supra note 1 at 299-300 (indicating that when he was first questioned, plaintiff claimed he was of
Spanish-Hawaiian origin and that his name was Clyde Sarah).
48
See id.
49
See Stone, supra note 1 at 299.
50
See Korematsu v. United States, 65 S. Ct. 193, 194 (1944).
51
See id. at 194-195.
46
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from a particular area, due to national security concerns, is deemed constitutional. Using the
aforementioned as a starting premise highlights the extreme power the government has and broad
agenda available to it, if postulated under the context of national security. As the Court noted
that while “…exclusion from the area in which one’s home is located is a far greater deprivation
than constant confinement to the home [the] imminent danger to public safety [posited by the
military] constitutionally justifies” both.52
As the war effort escalated and the government enacted more severe measures to
counteract what they perceived to be a growing threat of disloyalty within the United States, the
Court appeared to be mirroring and accepting such alarmist sentiment. Proceeding in their
analysis, the Court accepts as necessary the “…exclusion of those of Japanese origin [solely]
because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group,” a vague
number which was stipulated by the military.53 In doing so, then the Court attempted to reframe
the issue from one of racial prejudice to wartime necessity.54 Writing for the majority, Justice
Black asserted that “[we] are not unmindful of the hardships…imposed upon a large group of
American citizens. But hardships are part of war and war is an aggregation of hardships. All
citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure.”55
Therefore, individuals of Japanese descent, such as the plaintiff who was an American citizen,
was not being racially discriminated against by the Exclusion Order based on the context in
which it was issued. Justice Black continues to reframe the issue by stating that “…to cast this
case into outlines of racial prejudice…confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the
[West Coast] because of hostility to…his race [but] because the…military authorities…decided
52
53
54
55

See Korematsu, 65 S. Ct. at 195.
See id. at 196.
See Stone, supra note 1 at 300.
See Korematsu, 65 S. Ct. at 195-196.
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that the…urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
from the [area]. We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now
say that at that time these actions were justified.”56
The inherent weakness in the majority’s attempt to reframe the issue in order to justify
their extreme deference to the government is captured by the dissent. The dissent urges that in
order to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights is subject to greater scrutiny and
therefore a greater standard of judicial review. Justice Murphy, writing for the dissent stated
“[t]he judicial test of whether the [g]overnment, on a plea of military necessity, can validly
deprive an individual of his constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably related
to a public danger that is so ‘immediate, imminent and impending’ as not to admit of delay and
not to permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger.57
While Justice Murphy requires less than the historically situated strict scrutiny of judicial
review used by the Court in analyzing decisions discriminating against individuals based on
invidious categories, he nonetheless challenged the validity of the Court’s level of deference to
the point where he indicated that such deference demonstrates carelessness by the Supreme
Court. This is apparent when he chastised the majority for accepting as evidence overgeneralizations and stereotypes presented by the government. He stated that while, “…there
were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent on the Pacific Coast who did all in their power
to aid their ancestral land…but to infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group
disloyalty and justify discriminatory action against the entire group is the deny that under our

56
57

See Korematsu, 65 S. Ct. at 197.
See id. at 202-203.
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system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights.”58 Furthermore, even
while holding the government to a lesser standard of scrutiny, Justice Murphy asserted that
“…no adequate reason is given for the failure to treat these Japanese Americans on an individual
basis by holding investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from disloyal, as was done in
the case of persons of German or Italian ancestry. [T]he factors of time and military necessity
[do not appear] as urgent as they have been represented to be.”59
The dissent pointed out that the Court essentially provided carte blanche to the
government to discriminate based on national origin, based on the fact that the nation was in the
midst of extreme turmoil and recovering from a catastrophic shock inflicted by Pearl Harbor.
This however, did not hold weight in the grand scheme of events as the Supreme Court, in this
and subsequent decisions continued to show deference to governmental decisions due to national
security concerns. As Stone asserts, while the Supreme Court “…embraced a new approach to
the constitutionality of laws discriminating against aliens,” it did not move away from
demonstrating increased deference to the government when national security concerns were at
bay.60 Essentially, while the “morality and constitutionality of the [actual] internment”
continued to be questioned, military necessity continued to exist as a viable governmental
justification for either curtailing or relaxing constitutional guarantees heavily protected by the
Courts.61

58

See Korematsu, 65 S. Ct. at 205.
See id. at 205-206 (referring to House Report No. 2124 from the 77th Cong., 2d Sess. at 247-252 where Justice
Murphy highlights the disconnect in the government’s logic by indicating that had they been concerned with
maintaining the rights of Japanese Americans and not discriminating against them based on generalities, the
government would have seriously evaluated the threat by distinguishing disloyal from loyal members as they did
with individuals of Italian and German ancestry).
60
See Stone, supra note 1 at 303-304.
61
See id. at 307.
59
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Based on theoretical and historical antecedents, under exigent circumstances such as
national security threats posed to the United States, the Supreme Court has and most probably
will uphold decisions circumventing individual liberty and constitutional rights. Even the most
sacred of rights, the freedom of speech under the First Amendment, has been curtailed in order to
protect the government in times of crises.62 The backlash caused by the events of September 11th
continues to afflict the Muslim community in America, causing members to respond to hate
speech and religious slurs through increasing radical and violent means.63 In the wake of
incidents such as the attempted bombing of Times Square and the Boston Marathon bombings,
domestic terrorism is a real and ever-present threat to the security of the United States. It is
essential that the coordinating branches promulgate an anti-hate speech ordinance to prevent the
spread of domestic terrorism at the source: by stopping the increasing marginalization of the
Muslim community caused by hate speech.

Part III:

The Harm in Hate Speech: A Viable National Security Threat

The alignment of free speech with ideas of individual autonomy and the curtailment of
increased government control over such autonomy is the main reason why First Amendment
protections are heavily guarded.64 This requires individuals to “tolerate” all forms of speech,
even hate speech, because some believe that the freedom of such speech is directly linked to the
freedom to think such thoughts.65 It is the effect of the speech which is unequal and therefore

62
63
64
65

See supra Parts I and II.
See supra Part I, note 15.
See Waldron, supra note 2 at 32.
See e.g. ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE 162-166 (Basic Books, 1st ed. 2007).
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inhibits the other freedoms enshrined in the Constitutions which are guaranteed to each and
every citizen of the United States of America.66
The harm arising from hate speech “…is harm in the first instance [only] to the groups
who are denounced or bestialized,” through such speech.67 The targets of first instance are
“polluted by [such] materials [to the point where they cannot] lead their lives, [or bring] up their
children…in this social environment.”68 Individuals subject to the aforementioned, who face and
experience such intolerance, hate, animosity and basic indignities, become increasingly
marginalized in society.69 At some point the marginalization moves from the point of selfintrospection to a direct response. An anti-hate speech ordinance is required in order to quell and
prevent such a response as it would pose a domestic security threat and destabilize already
precarious relations between the federal government and members belonging to Muslim and
immigrant communities in the United States.70 And it is due to its political necessity that it will
not pose constitutional challenges to First Amendment values.
In his book The Harm in Hate Speech,71 Jeremy Waldron provides a compelling
argument indicating that the psychological and collective harm to communities as a result of hate
speech are akin to forms of physical abuse.72 Waldron reframes the case for hate speech

66

See e.g. THE U.S. CONST., amends. I, XIII, XIV, XV.
See Waldron, supra note 2 at 33.
68
See id.
69
See John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 539-540 (2006) (describing the
pervasiveness of hate speech as it impacts all areas of everyday life).
70
See Shirin Sinnar, Trends in Post 9/11 Backlash Employment Discrimination, Address Before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law Panel (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.bnabooks.com/ababna/eeo/2006/
sinnar.pdf. (stating generally that in the post 9/11 era, discrimination, harassment and violence against Sikhs have
risen because based on their beards and turbans, they were associated as being “Muslim”).
71
See Waldron, supra note 2.
72
See id. at 33.
67
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legislation by moving away from arguments put forth by critics of hate speech legislation,73 who
state that advocates of such legislation essentially want to legally punish and “…forbid
expressions of ‘extreme’ intolerance or ‘extreme’ dislike,” whenever this is viewed as a bad
thing.74 However, as Waldron states, advocates of hate speech legislation do not focus on
forbidding extreme emotions or methods of expression, but rather focus on “…the predicament
of vulnerable people who are subject to hatred directed at their race, ethnicity or religion.”75
Furthermore, I would argue that advocates are equally concerned with the effect on society as a
whole due to the reaction of vulnerable people to their constant subjection and experience of hate
speech.
Waldron broadly describes the social harm caused by hate speech, concomitantly to the
communities who are recipients of hate speech and society as a whole. Public expressions
undoubtedly have an effect on people’s lives. While individuals have been given basic rights
under the United States Constitution such as the freedom of worship, freedom to congregate,
freedom from discrimination based on invidious categories, Waldron asserts that individuals
additionally have the right to security. They have a right to be secure from public expressions of
“…derision, hostility and abuse encouraged [and incited] by hateful propaganda [as this has] a
severely negative impact on [an] individual’s sense of self-worth and acceptance.”76 Waldron
further asserts that the aforementioned sentiments caused by hate speech, in turn always
engenders harsh and explosive reactions from marginalized communities. He asserts that “…the
impact [of hate speech] causes target groups members to take drastic measures in reaction,
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perhaps avoiding activities which bring them in contact with non-group members,” leading to
extreme isolationist tendencies.77 In turn, the reactions of such marginalized communities
“…bear heavily in a nation that prides itself on tolerance and fostering of human dignity through,
among other things, respect for the many racial, religious and cultural groups…in society.”78
In addition, because hate speech attacks individual dignity, it is particularly corrosive and
endangers general public welfare. As Waldron highlights, “…personal dignity is not just a
decorative fact about [an] individual, [i]t is a matter of status and as such it is in large part
normative: it is something about a person that commands respect from other and from the
state.”79 Personal dignity is defined only in part by individuals. It is also based on how
individuals are regarded by the state and other members of society, determined by the
“…recognition of …rights or entitlements,” given to such individuals.80 Hate speech besmirches
the personal dignities of individuals and invariably affects their status in society overall because
as targets of negative sentiments they do not receive the same treatment and therefore protections
from the state. As the recipients of such comments they begin to believe that the state has
accorded them second class status.81 Perceived feelings of inferiority or unequal treatment from
the state are extremely dangerous as history indicates, because individuals of target communities
begin to disassociate themselves as citizens of the state and experience a psychological break in
loyalty.82 As hate speech creates negative solidarity and increases the wedges between members
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of different communities, it adversely impacts members who are targets of such hate speech and
society as a whole. Personal dignity is not defined as self-respect or self-esteem, but is defined
as a reflection of the right to have an equal status and receive protection for that status in
society.83
It is the psychological harm posed by the assault hate speech inflicts on the dignities of
individuals within a targeted community indicates the direct relationship between hate speech
and the incitement of violence.84 The distress caused to an individual’s feelings is not what antihate speech legislation seeks to prohibit or remedy: it is the assault on an individual’s personal
dignity and character as a “citizen” within society which it seeks to preserve.85 While an
individual’s feelings may be soothed through such a remedy, that effect is only secondary. The
concept of preserving dignity and therefore prohibiting degrading treatment is recognized
universally. The best example is seen in “…the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Article 7 and in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights [each] primarily
designed to protect people against being treated in ways that diminish their elementary status as
persons.”86 As Waldron espouses, an assault on dignity is not just limited to one aspect of an
individual’s life and identity, “…it is linked to [other] aspects such as reason, understanding,
autonomy, free will and normative self-regard. Degradation [therefore] is not possible without
some conscious impact.”87
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While the United States has not adopted or ratified agreements such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Constitution has enshrined basic liberties and
included protections against various forms of degradation88 because of the debilitating impact of
degradation on the human psyche and in turn society at large. Being exposed to continued
degradation in the form of hate speech brings about “…a plethora of thoughts and emotions
[rendering individuals unable’ to differentiate terror from outrage, from offense, from insult,
from incredulity, from acutely uncomfortable self-consciousness, from the perception of a threat,
from humiliation, from rage, from a sense that one’s world have been up-ended, from sickening
familiarity, from the apprehension of further assaults or worse…from the shame” caused by such
rhetoric.89
Due to the danger posed, it is “…tremendously important that assurance [against hate
speech] be conveyed [to prevent people from feeling] insecure, unwanted or despised in social
settings [and] in social interaction.”90 Hate speech is particularly dangerous to the public welfare
of society and most directly, a nation’s national security, because it attempts to “…negate the
implicit assurance that a society offers to the members of vulnerable groups—that they are
accepted in society.”91 In order to prevent the effect of hate speech on society, while taking into
account the “…absolutist language of the First Amendment,” the best justification under which
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an anti-hate speech ordinance can be promulgated is where the foundations of government are
perceived to be at risk.92
The Supreme Court decisions in RAV v. St. Paul93 and Snyder v. Phelps94 demonstrate
that the promulgation of an anti-hate speech ordinance under the aforementioned circumstances
would be accepted. In RAV v. St. Paul, the Court found the ordinance unconstitutional because it
attempted to “…shield [acts] because they express[ed] a discriminatory idea or philosophy.”95
The Court stated that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional because the language in the
ordinance has not been precisely tailored to avoid impermissibly restricting individuals who
could use proposed “fighting words,” should they be used by individuals in contexts other than
those which would “arouse anger and resentment in others.”96 The Court furthermore did not
accept the argument put forth by the Defendants, asserting that the ordinance was “…intended,
not to impact of the right of free expression of the accused, but rather to protect against the
victimization of a person or persons who are particularly vulnerable because of their membership
in a group that historically has been discriminated against.”97 While the protection of minorities
against discrimination is a compelling state interest, the Court concomitantly stated that,
balanced against the “…danger of censorship, presented by a facially content-based
statute…[t]he dispositive question in this case [was] whether content discrimination [was]
reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul’s compelling interests.”98 The Court, by subjecting the
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ordinance to strict scrutiny, determined that there were other less restrictive means available to
the state than restricting First Amendment rights. It is because the ordinance was subjected to
the highest level of scrutiny that it failed. Had the state presented the ordinance under one of the
limited exceptions to the bar against content restriction under the First Amendment, the
ordinance would not have received the same treatment by the Court. Finally, because the antihate speech ordinance would be provided under a different basis and would be tailored to
achieve the national security aims of the government, it would not receive the same treatment as
the ordinance at issue in RAV v. St. Paul.
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Snyder v. Phelps similarly indicates that the Court
would treat an anti-hate speech ordinance enacted as a “war time” measure, differently than
ordinances which provide content based restrictions on speech in order to protect the rights of
minorities. The Court indicated that while there are instances where the prohibition of particular
words will not receive First Amendment protections,99 these instances must fall within the
narrow exceptions to the broad application of the First Amendment. In addition, the Court
acknowledged that Westboro’s picketing was meant to coincide with Matthew Snyder’s funeral,
however; the church “did not itself disrupt that funeral,” and the words did not rise to level of
provoking imminent violence.100 In the aftermath of 9/11 and rise of domestic terrorism, it
cannot be said that hate speech, which has been conclusively linked to the rise in marginalization
of Muslims in the United States, has not and will not provoke imminent violence.
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Part IV:
Context

Reviving Chaplinsky: Putting “Fighting Words” Into a Contemporary

The concept of a “fighting words” doctrine within the context of hate speech first
appeared before the United States Supreme Court in 1942 and was debated in Chaplinsky v.
N.H.101. In the aforementioned case, the Court affirmed the conviction under the “fighting
words” statute, finding principally that: (1) the appellant violated the statute and (2) the statute
did not contravene the First Amendment.102 The statute at issue was Chapter 378, §2, of the
Public Law of New Hampshire, which stated that “…no person shall address any offensive,
derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or public place nor
call him by any offensive or derisive name…to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business
or occupation.”103 It essentially outlawed the use or direction of offensive words which were
intended to offend or annoy individuals and thereby affect their ability to pursue their livelihood.
Without citing any political exigency the Supreme Court affirmed the statute’s
constitutionality, concomitantly affirming the validity of curbing certain forms of speech which
would prevent individuals from pursuing their livelihood. Based on this precedent, establishing
a federal ordinance which would similarly make it unlawful for individuals to direct certain slurs
or epithets towards each other in public forums would be an alien or foreign concept. In
addition, placing such a federal ordinance against the backdrop of September 11 and the need to
protect, first and foremost, the government from domestic threats serving as reprisals by minority
communities, provides even more motivation and necessity for such a doctrine.
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Crafting an anti-hate speech ordinance in the context of September 11th would primarily
curb the use of epithets used to degrade Muslims, individuals of Middle Eastern origin or those
who “appear” to look Middle Eastern. The need for anti-hate speech legislation is great, as
studies conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other reputable
organizations demonstrate, employees alleging discrimination based on religion and national
origin increased significantly right after September 11th and have held steady.104 Apart from
employees, ordinary Muslims and individuals of Middle Eastern origin have experienced
increased discrimination as well.105 An anti-hate speech ordinance overall, is beneficial and the
most efficient remedy to combat such discrimination and protect the national security interests of
the United States.106
Temporarily outlawing the use of epithets involving individuals of the aforementioned
communities, many of which overlap, narrowly tailors the type of speech restrained, to those
most vulnerable in the aftermath of September 11th. As Waldron asserts, such an ordinance
would not “…make decisions about the lawfulness and unlawfulness of certain speech acts on
the basis of a case-by-case analysis of the emotions of particular victims. Instead [it would]
identify categories and modes of expressions that…are likely to have an impact on the dignity of
members of [these particular] vulnerable minorities” at this particular time.107 Doing so provides
protection against criticisms that the ordinance is over-inclusive. The sanctioned slurs would be
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limited to ones stemming from September 11 and directed at individuals in public forums, with
the intent to arouse anger and reasonably would provoke imminent violence.108
Moreover, focusing on religious epithets and slurs directed at Muslims and those of
Middle Eastern origin avoids the possibility that such an anti-hate speech ordinance will be void
for vagueness. Listing the particular religious epithets or the general categories which would be
banned would put the public on notice as to the prohibited speech. It additionally also allows for
the ordinance to be based on an objective standard, where the prohibited slurs and epithets stem
from what has been shown to be degrading and therefore is not dependant on how a particular
individual of a vulnerable minority reacts to such language. Focusing on what is objectively
degrading and therefore dangerous to society as a whole, adds greater veracity to the aim of such
an ordinance: curbing the radicalization of marginalized communities and increases in incidents
of domestic terrorism.
Another component of such an anti-hate speech ordinance which indicates that it would
not impermissibly restrict the First Amendment rights of individuals is that it would be subject to
a time limitation. Therefore, individuals who use religious epithets will be sanctioned as long as
exigent circumstances stemming from the aftermath of September 11th exist. This tailors the
restriction to specific contexts and for the specific purpose of protecting America as a whole,
given the political circumstances of the times. Creating a time limit would qualify as a
reasonable restriction, legitimizing the “domestic threat” justification provided by the federal
government and over time help eliminate such speech from the marketplace, because it sends the
message that it is of such low value or offensive that it should not be utilized. Once the
government no longer feels that exigent circumstances do not exist to such a level where
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domestic terrorism is no longer a grave threat, the ordinance will cease to have effect. By that
time, the marketplace of ideas will undoubtedly have generated a more tolerant and less divisive
society. As Onder Bakircioglu asserts, while “…legal regulation or control [of hate speech]
cannot cure [it from society], law [is the only sufficient] tool to regulate human conduct,
including speech, which might at times be a deadly weapon.”109
The particular degrading words which would be ones which provide the most offense
based on the antecedents with September 11th as well as misconceptions about Muslims and
individuals who appear to “look” Muslims or are of Middle Eastern origin. Words derogatory of
the national origin of such individuals (towel head, rag head, camel worshipper) and their faith
(dog, terrorist, Osama lover, Jihadists, Islamists, anti-American, suicide bomber, ) should be
prohibited. Additionally, “fighting words” relating to the outwards appearance, religious
apparel, institutions of worship and using epithets about a religion should be banned.110 While
seemingly broad, the war-time context in which the proposed anti-hate speech ordinance is being
proposed does not indicate that Courts will find it overly broad. Unlike in RAV v. St. Paul,
however, the proposed ordinance restricts the use of certain words only because it falls under one
of the narrow exceptions where the First Amendment protections may be contravened.111
Finally, the sanctions for using prohibited slurs should be tailored so that they do not
provide excessive punishment should individuals disobey the anti-hate speech ordinance.
Therefore, acceptable fines which do not unduly burden the Courts, law enforcement or
excessively punish individuals would be monetary fines and possible jail time, should the
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violation of the ordinance be severe and pervasive enough to be viewed as a misdemeanor. The
number of slurs used, frequency and nature of the violation should be taken into account when
fining individuals who violate the anti-hate speech ordinance. While requiring some exercise of
discretion by the Courts, the precise tailoring of such an ordinance and remedies available to
victims of hate speech stemming from September 11th coupled with the national security
concerns, is enough to ensure that such an ordinance will be upheld.

Part V:

Conclusion

In sum, an anti-hate speech ordinance to prohibit certain words stemming from the
aftermath of 9/11 put forth to curb national security concerns in the wake of September 11,
would be one of the only conceivable ways to promulgate such legislation. It is the only
conceivable method because it takes advantage of one of the narrow exceptions under which
First Amendment protections will be circumvented by the Courts. The promulgation of such an
ordinance provides advantages both to the United States government and members of the
Muslim community in the United States. For the former, stopping the marginalization of
Muslims post 9/11 by truncating assaults on their social reputation within the broader United
States community, and showing tolerance is a crucial step in curbing domestic terrorism. For the
latter, Muslims in the United States will be able to participate in American society as equals.
This encourages and precipitates increased social harmony and therefore less of a need to resort
to violent tactics or responses. Finally, as such an ordinance would be time limited and narrowly
tailored in its proscriptions and remedies for violators, the Courts would able to better enforce it
without compromising the other rights afforded to individuals. In order to best protect the
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national security interests of the United States and allow for the marketplace of ideas to root out
hate speech, an anti-hate speech ordinance justified as a national security measure is required.
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